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COMMENTARY 
SCHOLARSHIP AMOK: EXCESSES IN THE PURSUIT 
OF TRUTH AND TENURE 
Kenneth Lasson:;' 
[N]ot everything that man thinks must he say; not everything he says 
must he write, but most important not everything that he has written 
must he publish. 
KING SOLOMON (1033-975 B.C.)1 
There are two things wrong with almost all legal writing. One is its 
style. The other is its content. 
YALE LAW PROFESSOR FRED RODELL (1907-1980)2 
Here we are, three millennia after Solomon and a full half-century 
since Fred Rodell, and what have we? 
In 1937, when Rodell issued his once-famous diatribe, some ISO 
law-related journals were being published3 (not to mention thousands 
of local newspapers and countless full-color comic books). Now there 
are over eight hundred legal periodicals4 (not to mention a drastically 
dwindled number of daily papers, and precious few comics). Both 
Solomon and Rodell have been all but forgotten. What, indeed, have 
we wrought? Although Rodell predicted his original panning would 
have no effect, could he have anticipated the sheer dimensions of this 
worst-case scenario - that his "professional purveyors of pretentious 
poppycock"5 would have spawned so furiously, that the contemporary 
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore. I wish to acknowledge all those who inspired 
this Commentary, many of whom know who they are. 
These notes are offered mostly as an accommodation to the editors, who labor under the 
dual handicaps of tradition and inexperience. Recognizing the few pros and cons of footnoting, 
however - see infra pp. 937-41 - I have taken some pains to make my references a bit more 
relevant, entertaining, and minimal than the reader who has gotten this far has a right to 
expect. 
1 Rav Yisroel Salanter (1810-1883) attributes the saying to Solomon in KOHELESIECCLE-
SIASTES 202 (Artscroll Tanach Series ed. 1976). See Ecclesiastes 12:12 ("[T]he making of many 
books is without limit. "). 
2 Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REv. 38, 38 (1936). Rodell's Goodbye was 
once called "perhaps the most widely read - and most controversial - article in all of legal 
literature." Margolick, Always the Rebel, Nat'l L.]., May 5, 1980, at I, 24, col. 2; see also 
Wright, Goodbye to Fred Rodell, 89 YALE L.J. 1455 (1980). 
3 See INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS, Aug. 1937-July 1940. 
4 See 9 CURRENT LAW INDEX pt. a (1988) (providing a list of such publications). 
5 Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews - Revisited, 48 VA. L. REv. 279, 286 (1962). 
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law reviews he collectively called "spinach"6 would have mushroomed 
into such a gargantuan souffle of airy irrelevance? 
Lo, the voices are heard once again in the wilderness, from the 
bewildered among us innocent (or ignorant) enough to try writing the 
wrongs perpetrated in the name of Scholarship. 
Few professors today delude themselves about (or are able to 
luxuriate in) the long-romanticized lifestyle of Academia: walking the 
quiet quadrangles of neatly manicured college gardens, discoursing 
timelessly with colleagues, thinking higher thoughts. Fewer still aspire 
to scholarship purely in search of Truth. Nowadays the goal of ( 
publication is much less to find answers than to avoid perishing in 
pursuit of promotion and tenure. 
The threshold question, of course, is why Scholarship? "He who 
increases knowledge," said Solomon, "increases grief."7 
Certainly there exist among us the genuine scholars of yesteryear, 
dutifully reporting their original ideas and producing from time to 
time provocative prose and innovative agendas. (Rodell himself be-
longed in this small group, if for no other reason than having been 
the first to say publicly what so many of us - weaker-kneed, wimpier-
eyed, and more thoroughly word-processed - privately bemoan 
within the sanctum, sanctorum of the faculty lounge.) 
But for every pure scholar we have a dozen-and-a-half of the 
innocent ersatz, for every diamond a heap of rhinestones. Some of 
them are decent enough thinkers stickied-up by pedestrian prose, 
industrious worker-bees who - simply by virtue of the thousands of 
articles with which they must periodically compete - must of neces-
sity be deemed mediocre. They are in greater part, however, com-
petent enough teachers without anything original to write, doomed to 
scholarly mediocrity by academic imperative - coerced clones who 
are whipped into a hack's frenzy, urged to jump through hoops held 
up by the local promotion-and-tenure committee, forced to shimmy 
down the chutes of the publication process. 
To some degree all of them - whether genuine scholars, would-
be wisemen, or coerced clones - are motivated by the gratification 
of ego, the satisfaction of habit, and the expectations of university 
image-makers. In turn these traits are fueled by faculty self-studies, 
administrative mission statements, and fiats laid down by the Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools,8 most of which become etched in 
ivory long before their floppy disks ever begin to stiffen. 
This Commentary is intended as much to define scholarship as to 
debunk it, to separate the wind-blown chaff from the few kernels that 
6 See Rodell, supra note 2, at 45. 
7 Ecclesiastes 1:18. 
8 See, e.g., ASS'N OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK § 6.8 (1988). 
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might nourish the mind. Legal scholarship is largely illustrated by 
the law reviews which, conversely, both contribute to and reflect the 
value system by which the academy is governed. Even cursory ob-
servation of the literature leads to an inescapable conclusion: the 
number of whole-grain scholars is much smaller than that suggested 
by the burgeoning reviews, the number of whole-grain journals but a 
fraction of the fruited plains currently being harvested in law libraries 
across the land. Analysis, research, and writing are overblown, while 
classroom competence, community service, and non-law review schol-
arship are under-credited. The system is askew. The academy has a 
problem. 
I. MULTITUDES AND MINUTIAE 
In an ideal world, people govern themselves; governments pass 
laws only when necessary; laws are easy to understand and follow; 
lawyers are uniformly bright, energetic advocates - fair, ethical, and 
sensitive; they emerge from law schools offering logical, interesting 
curricula taught by fair, sensitive professors; and the curricula are 
complemented by the fruits of faculty research - which scholarship 
is distilled into useful, interesting articles and published in well-edited 
reviews. 
In the real world all of the above may exist, but in greatly dimin-
ishing degree. Scholarship could be valuable; most of it isn't. What-
ever rich stew there might have been thins quickly into gruel through 
the sheer multitude of journals seeking fodder for their troughs. Slops 
fill the law reviews. Simply put, there are too many of them. 
Consider the numbers involved. Of the 8oo-plus journals in the 
exclusive Current Law Index alone, most appear at least three times 
throughout the year, each with several lead articles apiece. By con-
servative estimate, that's five thousand new pieces annually! Could 
even a small percentage of this massive productivity (which law li-
brarians privately label the Junk Stream) be worth readers' whiles? 
And, one must hasten to ask, what readers? Most reviews have 
very limited circulations, consisting primarily of libraries and alumni. 
Few in the latter group pay any attention to the esoteric titles ap-
pearing on the cover, much less to the contents inside. For all the 
work professors put into law review articles, one would think they'd 
be able to attract a larger audience than the sprinkling of colleagues 
who skim through off-prints out of courtesy or the handful of students 
who may wade through them because they've been assigned. Even 
fewer practicing attorneys read such secondary sources out of non-
billable interest. 
Helping to perpetuate this endless multitude of articles are ex-
haustive "research tools," supplying comprehensive cross-references 
and mind-boggling databases. The Index to Legal Periodicals and 
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the Current Law Index both reflect and contribute to the epidemic 
proportions of publication. 
Beyond sheer numbers, consider the journals themselves. The 
Harvard Law Review is arguably the 0ldest,9 still among the toughest 
to break into,lO and certainly the one most emulated, both in form 
and content. Yet even Harvard's goals were exceedingly modest at 
the beginning. From Volume I, Number I: 
Our object, primarily, is to set forth the work done in the school with 
which we are connected, to furnish news of interest to those who have 
studied law in Cambridge, and to give, if possible, to all who are 
interested in the subject of legal education, some idea of what is done 
under the Harvard system of instruction. Yet we are not without 
hopes that the Review may be serviceable to the profession at large. 11 
How serviceable the Harvard Law Review has been in all the years 
since remains open to question, but of the most-cited articles in the 
past half-century the overwhelming majority come from Cambridge. 12 
Nevertheless every law school now has at least one review to call 
its own, each looking and reading depressingly like the rest. Despite 
scattered attempts by editors to distinguish their journals by theme 
and discipline, redundancy abounds. Besides the fundamentally fun-
gible general-interest reviews, we have the Journal of Law and Reli-
gion and the Journal of Church and State; the International Lawyer 
and the Journal of International Law (not to mention the Connecticut 
Journal of International Law, the Yale Journal of International Law, 
and the Wisconsin Journal of International Law); the American Crim-
inal Law Review, the Criminal Law Journal, the Criminal Law Bul-
letin, the Criminal Law Quarterly, and the Criminal Law Review. 
The list goes on and on. Law reviews are published from Adelaide 
to Zambia. There's the Pacific Basin Law Review, the San Fernando 
Valley Law Review, and the Samoan Pacific Law Review. Don't know 
which one is best for your little gem-of-an-opus? Try the Directory 
9 See Cane, The Role oj Law Review in Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL Enuc. 215 (1981). 
10 If so, certain enraged readers may ask, how can it accept a piece like this? The writer 
himself, though, rejects Groucho Marx's famous analysis - "I'd never join a club that would 
have somebody like me as a member" - and congratulates the editors on their good judgment. 
Truth to tell, given the central thesis presented herein, there was little doubt it would be 
published somewhere among the 800-plus journals currently clogging legal libraries everywhere; 
might as well start at the top. For a confidential list of those journals that rejected this article, 
please send a self-addressed stamped envelope to Professor Kenneth Lasson, University of 
Baltimore School of Law, Maryland at Mount Royal, Baltimore, Maryland 21201. This offer 
expires when I run out of self-satisfaction. 
II I HARV. L. REv. 35 (1887). 
12 See Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Ret,iew Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1540, 1549-51 
(1985). In addition, Harvard is still the only review in America that is self-sustaining, unsub-
sidized by university or bar association. See Cane, supra note 9, at 215. 
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for Successful Publishing in Legal Periodicals, which lists only the 
450 most choice ones. 
The lead articles themselves are often overwhelming collections of 
minutiae, perhaps substantively relevant at some point in time to an 
individual practitioner or two way out in the hinterlands - and that 
almost entirely by chance. Otherwise they are relegated to oblivion, 
or if lucky to a passing but see in someone else's obscure piece. 
True (and perhaps good), law today pervades all aspects of life -
but must all aspects of life be treated in law reviews? Here's a 
sampling of recent articles: 
The Unrecognized Uses of Legal Education in Papua New Guineal3 
The Legal Status of Fish Farmingl4 
Epistemological Foundations and Meta-Hermeneutic Methods: The 
Search for a Theoretical Justification of the Coercive Force of Legal 
I nterpretationl5 
If Spot Bites the Neighbor, Should Dick and Jane Go to Jail?16 
Judicial Review: From the Frog to Mickey Mouse l7 
What's Love Got To Do With It? Critical Legal Studies, Feminist 
Discourse, and the Ethic of Solidarity l8 
Morality or Sittlichkeit: Toward a Post-Hegelian Solution19 
Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture20 
Toward an Economic Theory of Voluntary Resignation by Dictators21 
The Dijferentzation of Francophone Rapists and Nonrapists Using 
Penile Circumferential Measures22 
Why Study Pacific Salmon Law?23 
Why, indeed. 
You may not be able to tell an article by its title, but it's evident 
that originality is in short supply among authors and editors wonder-
13 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (1987). 
141987 J. PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 484. 
15 68 B.U.L. REv. 733 (1988). 
16 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1445 (1988); see also New South Carolilla Dog Bite Rule, 38 S.C.L. 
REv. 236 (1986). 
17 32 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 284 (1981); see also Rediscoverillg Traditiollal Tort Typologies To 
Determille Media Liability jor Physical Injuries: From the Mickey Mouse Club to Hustler 
Magazine, 10 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 969 (1988). 
18 II HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 53 (1988). 
19 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 1389 (1989). 
20 1986 WIS. L. REv. 527. 
21 5 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 199 (1985). 
22 13 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 419 (1986). 
23 22 IDAHO L. REv. 629 (1986). 
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ing what to call their mind-numbing research. According to LEXIS, 
the words "toward," "model," and "theory" have appeared in no fewer 
than 7275 titles during the past decade alone24 - making them the 
most popular titular buzzwords since "integrated" and "functional" 
came down the pike. "Confusion" reigns at the top of 358 recent 
articles. 25 In fact you can find almost any word you can think of -
even "penile" has shown up six times in the past three years. 26 
Legislative analysis frequently turns into law review manure. Do 
we really need 141 separate articles on federal solid-waste-disposal 
laws? Would that the promulgators of scholarship patterns recognize 
the dimensions of their own garbage-removal problem. Too often, 
though, they're more concerned with churning it out. They pollute 
the environment. They miss the forests they destroy for the knotted 
trees in whose dark shade they obscurely bask.27 
But the journals continue to take themselves ever so seriously. 
That's another reason why the literature of the law is perhaps the 
most massive of any profession. A colleague of mine28 reports that 
the editors of one midwestern law review were not amused when he 
asked them the status of their potato-law symposium issue. Perhaps 
they were having trouble digging up lead articles, but chances are 
they had too many sacksful to choose from. 
II. VALUE AMONG THE VOLUME(S) 
It's been said before that law reviews were made to be written 
and not read. Regardless of their questionable benefit to bar and 
bench, they do have some value for some students. The few who 
"make law review" no doubt receive exceptionally good training in 
logical thought and formal exposition, not to mention source-checking. 
24 The figures, tabulated as of November 1989, are absurdly easy to gather and verify by 
modern computer. My thanks to University of Baltimore Law Librarian Emily Greenberg and 
her associate Will Tress for their generous instruction and use of the school's Lexis key. Tress 
holds the current world records (both semester and career) for the fewest "inappropriate com-
mand" rebukes from a legal database. 
2S Look it up yourself. 
26 Could we be moving "Towards a Model Penile Code"? 
27 A pertinent passage: ) 
[T]he possible undervaluation of motherhood entailed by the mother/soldier parallel is 
similar to the possible undervaluation of women's work implied by the elementary school 
teacher/garbage collector. . .. Undervaluing the traditionally female half of the parallel 
is only additional evidence of the culture's phallocentrismj it does not justify refusing to 
revalue nurses, teachers, and mothers at least to the extent that real estate appraisers, 
garbage collectors, and soldiers are valued. 
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1279, 1329 (1987). ';I'his article 
runs 58 pages and 34,072 words - of which 42 are either "phallocentrism" or "phallocentric" 
(meaning male dominance). 
28 Professor John Lynch, faculty advisor to the University of Baltimore Law Review. 
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Indeed, the reviews can do a good job correcting deficiencies in (or 
at least complementing) the traditional law school curriculum, which 
frequently provides precious little in the way of research and writing. 
They also offer an outlet for student initiative in the face of curricular 
boredom. However, the hard fact that the majority of law reviews 
are exclusive clubs, closed to all but those with the highest grades or 
demonstrated writing ability, calls the scope of their educational value 
into question. 29 
A good many professors can likewise benefit from researching and 
writing within their chosen fields of interest and discipline, in the 
process stimulating their involvement and dissipating that particular 
inertia which often permeates the Ivory Tower. 
But the limited value of legal scholarship as it appears in law 
reviews is largely outweighed by its costs. The proliferation of re-
search and writing tends more to increase quantity than quality. One 
article is no longer good enough for promotion; an aspirant must 
establish a "pattern" of publication. 30 
Professorial purposes can be accomplished in better ways than 
omphaloskepsis (law review-quality Greek for "contemplation of the 
navel"). 31 Belly-button gazing should be a luxury allowed only those 
few whose writing is deemed both incisive and succinct. The rest 
should be encouraged to more logical productivity as teachers and 
community leaders. 
Considering the scholarly stuff many obscure writers have to offer, 
they deserve the anonymity promised by the multitude of lesser jour-
nals. Some might even prefer it. 
Meanwhile, the impact of law reviews on the judiciary is dimin-
ishing;32 would their absence cause the courts to cease viewing issues 
analytically? No more than closing down the Department of Agricul-
ture's Rural Electrification Administration (Office of Information and 
Public Mfairs) would have any effect whatever on television watching 
in Appaloosa. In fact, as a casual glance through Shepard's Law 
Review Citations will disclose, the overwhelming majority of articles 
are noted not by courts or legislatures, but by one anotherP3 Re-
29 Some feel the fact that law reviews are mostly student-run constitutes a fundamental 
weakness. See J. SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL 183-85 (1978). 
30 See UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE SCHOOL OF LAW, FACULTY HANDBOOK at J-6 (1979-
1980). "Mechanical requirements cast in terms of a specific number of articles of a particular 
form or in particular journals are likely to cause more harm than good." Cramton, "The Most 
Remarkable Institution": The American Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. I, II (1986). 
31 Perhaps a better description is "sesquipedalian tergiversation" (multi-syllabled evasiveness). 
32 See Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 
(1989). 
33 See id. at 320 (pointing out the lack of "value and pertinence" of law reviews to judicial 
decisionmaking); Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEC'AL 
EDUC. 323, 336 (1989) (same). 
SCHOLARSHIP AMOK 933 
markably few are ever cited in the primary sources - case reports or 
annotated codes. 
There are so many publications clamoring to fill their pages with 
Law Most Learned, however, that few contributors need worry about 
dwindling forums for their prose. Moreover, all of the participants in 
the process - pupils, professors, practitioners, printers, and publish-
ers - are quite content to go on greasing one another's palms and 
egos.34 
Much of this enormous hodge-podge has a built-in obsolescence 
about it as well, largely by virtue of the law reviews' extended editing 
process. Most often the lag is so long between the first dull gleam in 
an author's eye and the finished product that whatever might be timely 
and relevant is largely lost on whatever few readers may be out there. 
The stuff is simply stale. Scholarship in the scientific community, by 
way of comparison, is of considerably greater utility and immediacy; 
that may explain why articles in medical journals, for example, are 
generally much shorter and contain fewer footnotes. 35 
Here and there amidst the morass of law reviews are occasional 
stabs at candid self-criticism. For example, various observers have 
noted that supposedly analytical commentaries are predominantly de-
scriptive and mildly plagiaristic;36 those published during pending 
litigation interfere with the judicial process;37 the scholarly voice lacks 
factual discipline;38 and that scholarship qua scholarship on law may 
not even exist. 39 Justice William Douglas said that law review articles 
are written by paid hacks espousing the views of their clients. 40 
Professor Arthur Miller argues that objectivity is impossible in law 
review articles because of lawyers' inalienable commitment to advo-
34 See Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor Must Publish, Must 
the Profession PerisM, 39 J. LEGAL EDuc. 343, 344-45 (1989); Rodell, supra note 2, at 45. 
But cf. Strong, The Iowa Law Review at Age Fifty, 50 IOWA L. REv. 12, 13 (1964) (supporting 
the existence of law reviews). 
35 See Austin, Footnotes As Product Differentiation, 40 VAND. L. REv. II31, II52 (1987); 
see also infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (arguing that the language of most law 
review articles does not effectively communicate to nonscholars). 
36 See, e.g., Nowak, Woe Unto You, Law Reviews!, 27 ARIZ. L. REv. 317, 322-23 (1985). 
3; See GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1018 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(Chambers, J., concurring and dissenting). 
38 See Getman, Voices, 66 TEX. L. REv. 577, 580-81 (1988). 
39 See Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cures, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1205 (1981); 
see also Jensen, The Law Review Manuscript Glut: The Need for Guidelines, 39 J. LEGAL 
EDuc. 383, 385 (1989) ("The legal publication system is, to put it bluntly, absurd."); Leibman 
& White, How the Student-Edited Law Journals Make Their Publication Decisions, 39 J. 
LEGAL EDuc. 387, 418 (1989) (discussing weaknesses in the law-review model and ways to 
correct those weaknesses). "[I]f a publication medium is perceived by its users to be biased, 
capricious, narrow, rigid, and unqualified, they will seek alternatives, even if the perceptions 
are mostly or totally unfounded." I d. 
40 See Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REv. 227, 229-31 (1965). 
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cacy.41 Professor Roger Cramton sees their "extraordinary prolifera-
tion" as "harmful for the nature, evaluation, and accessibility of legal 
scholarship. "42 Professor Elyce Zenoff (in an article entitled I Have 
Seen the Enemy and They Are Us) sums up the common criticisms: 
"Published articles lack originality, are boring, too long, too numerous, 
and have too many footnotes, which also are boring and too long. "43 
But these criticisms are few and far between and - perhaps also 
because they are published in law reviews themselves - go widely 
ignored. 
It was Rodell, again, who summed it up best - over fifty years 
ago: "This centripetal absorption in the home-made mysteries and 
sleight-of-hand of the law would be a perfectly harmless occupation 
if it did not consume so much time and energy that might better be 
spent otherwise. "44 Instead, we go on "blithely continuing to make 
mountain after mountain out of tiresome technical molehills,"45 not to 
mention the sacrifices made in personal income. It appears that law 
professors must be either independently wealthy or married to rich 
spouses. "Else why - once they have won their full professorships, 
at any rate - do they keep sUbmitting that turgid, legaldegooky 
garbage to law reviews - for free?"46 
Here's a modest (and unoriginal)47 proposal for reform: let the 
local reviews enhance the educational value needed to justify their 
41 See Miller, The Myth of Objectivity in Legal Research and Writing, 18 CATH. U.L. REv. 
290, 294-95 (1969). 
42 Cramton, supra note 30, at 8. For another inteJIigent critique, see Cramton, Demystifying 
Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. L.J. I (1986). See also Antoline, A Burst of SPecialty Allentatives, 
STUDENT LAW., May 1989, at 26-30 (discussing the proliferation of "alternative journals"); 
Jensen, supra note 39, at 384 (mentioning a "glut" of legal articles); Leibman & White, supra 
note 39, at 418 (describing a "flood of paper and ink at the medium- and high-impact journals". 
43 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 21, 21 (1986) (footnotes omitted); see also Gresham's Law of Legal 
Scholarship, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 307, 309 (1986) (suggesting that the principle of "adverse 
selection" operates in legal scholarship to ensure that "law review literature will be dominated 
by articles taking silly positions"). For an especially thoughtful, well-articulated - and unheeded 
- piece, see Bard, Scholarship, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 242 (1981). 
Scholarship is legal academe's temple jade: we sing its glories and genuflect before it, 
bedizen it with jewels, and then demean it by pretending to make it the gate keeper of 
the profession. It becomes the price we must pay to be a law professor, rather than the 
prime privilege of that calling. And, most justly, it reciprocates in kind, by forcing us 
to accept as scholarship work that is little more than ritualized diligence. 
Id. at 242; see also Murray, Publish and Perish - By Suffocation, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 566, 
566 (1975) (quoting George Eliot, who offered this sadly under-used benediction: "Blessed is the 
man who, having nothing to say, abstains from giving in words evidence of the fact."'; Cane, 
supra note 9, at 221 nn.35-39 and accompanying text (arguing that law reviews form the basis 
of an "old boy" network that propagates itself from generation to generation). For a particularly 
bitter, and thus more easily dismissed, attack on the system, see Elson, cited above in note 34. 
44 Rodell, supra note 2, at 43. 
4S Id. 
46 Rodell, supra note 5, at 288. 
47 See, e.g., Martin, The Law Review Citadel: Rodell Revisited, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1093, 
1990 ] SCHOLARSHIP AMOK 935 
existence by making themselves accessible to all the local law students 
and professors, and reduce their publication costs by putting all arti-
cles onto a computerized database instead of into print. Students and 
professors alike would thereby be able to polish their research and 
writing skills - without wasting the time of printers and publishers, 
postal workers, law librarians, and compulsive readers of junk mail. 
ITL SCHOLARSHIP: WE KNow IT WHEN WE SEE IT 
It is quite possible that reducing the number of law reviews might 
only address the symptoms of a deeper malaise - in particular the 
value system reflected by promotion-and-tenure policies as they are 
worshipfully applied through the criteria of "research, analysis, and 
writing." 
Webster's defines scholarship simply as "a fund of knowledge and 
learning. "48 Faculties of law have much more difficulty with the 
concept; they grapple with the meaning of scholarship just as Justice 
Stewart was unable to define pornography. "But I know it," he said, 
"when I see it. "49 
For purposes of promotion and tenure, "scholarship" means written 
and published materials which meet all of the following criteria: they 
are "analytical," "significant," "learned," "well-written," and "disinter-
ested."so 
Each of these terms is likewise chewed over like cud, all the while 
defying objective definition. To be analytical, according to the bylaws 
of the typical faculty, "[t]he materials must provide a detailed, well-
supported and sophisticated analysis that increases our understanding 
of the topic, and must do more than describe a body of law or a legal 
problem."sl A colleague of mine speaks of "massaging ideas," what-
ever that is. As we shall see shortly, no amount of analysis seems to 
increase our understanding of the term itself. 
II04 (1986); see also Hewitt, Altered States: Evolution or Revolution in Journal-Based Com-
municatiolls, 25 AMERICAN LIBR. 497, 497-500 (1989); Westwood, The Law Review Should 
Become tlte Law School, 31 VA. L. REv. 913 (1945). 
48 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1051 (1988) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S 
DICTIONARY]. 
49 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
50 See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE SCHOOL OF LAW, FACULTY HANDBOOK at H-I.6, 
H-I.7 (1989-1990) [hereinafter BALTIMORE FACULTY HANDBOOK]; cf UNIVERSITY OF MARY-
LAND SCHOOL OF LAW, FACULTY HANDBOOK at B.2-1 (1985) (noting that "[a] candidate for 
tenure is required to have engaged in significant research and to have produced a significant 
product or products"}. An exceptionally liberal policy, along the lines of that recommended in 
this Commentary, may be found in SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY, FACULTY HANDBOOK (1987), 
which notes that the criteria for promotion and tenure include an evaluation of the candidate's 
creative work, including "recognized accomplishment or significant production in the arts of 
painting, sculpture, music, drama, fiction, poetry, dance, journalism, or the like." !d. ~ 3.6.2. 
51 BALTIMORE FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at H-I.6. 
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To be significant, "[t]he materials must make a significant contri-
bution to the legal literature. They must do more than reiterate or 
rephrase previous analyses of the topic and they must not represent 
the work of others."52 But the words "significant" and "more than" 
are inescapably subjective. Were they applied strictly, a significant 
portion of all law review material would be thrown out as representing 
in some way the work of others. 
To be learned, "[t]he materials must demonstrate deep familiarity 
with and understanding of the body of knowledge associated with the 
topic. "53 To be well-written, they "must be written in a manner 
appropriate to the subject matter, and must demonstrate the candi-
date's ability to convey his or her ideas effectively."54 Again, these 
are patently subjective criteria that in most cases give no more guid-
ance in promotion and tenure decisions than does the gut feeling of 
how well a candidate gets along with his colleagues. 
Indeed, the only objective standard is the last. To be disinterested, 
"the materials must not be published to serve the interests of any 
client, either paid or pro bono. "55 But the overinclusiveness of this 
standard suggests a failure of common sense. Suppose a pro bono 
article goes against a client's interests? Suppose a professor is com-
missioned to do an exhaustive study? In neither case should his 
scholarship be discredited out of hand, but it is. 
Besides their inherent subjectivity, the promotion-and-tenure stan-
dards of most faculties focus unduly on articles published in law 
reviews. Often neither briefs nor practice manuals - no matter how 
learned or useful - are considered "scholarship." Nor would a case-
book or treatise be as presumptively satisfactory as a law review 
article. One wonders how the promotion and tenure committee would 
handle Socrates, who never published a word. 56 
One senior professor summed up the meaning of scholarship for 
the purposes of promotion and tenure from a much more practical 
and concrete point of view, giving this advice to a junior colleague: 
the way to get ahead, he advised, is to "take an obscure little problem 
that no one has thought much about, blow it out of all proportion, 
and solve it, preferably several times, in prestigious law reviews."57 
Law schools generally consider scholarship to be an amalgam of 
research, analysis, and writing. As such it is taught as a required 
52 [d. at H-I.6, H-I.7. 
53 [d. at H-I.7. 
54 [d. 
55 [d. 
56 I didn't think of this myself, but neither, I'm sure, did the journalist (whose name I forget) 
from whom I stole it. 
Si Barrett, To Read This Story in Full, Don't Forget To See the Footllotes, Wall St. ]., May 
10, 1988, at 25, col. 2. 
SCHOLARSHIP AMOK 937 
course in the first year, and genuflected upon in all years hence, from 
practice through retirement. But scholarship can be largely demysti-
fied by examining its traditional components. 
A. Research: Bushwhacking Through the Thickets 
Legal research is at once objective - that is, there are a finite 
number of sources to be gathered and culled - an'd an open-ended 
art form. 
With the advent of computerized data banks such as Lexis and 
Westlaw, gleaning all the cases on point is as easy as playing Trivial 
Pursuit and maybe even more fun. Finding everything that's ever 
been written on the subject requires little more than leafing through 
the Current Law Index or its older but perfectly adequate counterpart, 
the Index to Legal Periodicals. And the whole mass can be saturation-
bombed with cross-references by resorting to an endless array of Shep-
ard's Citations. (There, I've given away the secrets of legal research 
in less than a paragraph!) As for gleaning the most relevant and 
salient authorities, the possibilities are infinite - and are what sepa-
rate the grown-up academics from the boys and girls. 
Nowadays, unfortunately, research skills often amount to little 
more than mastery of the citation forms. The genuine scholars, be-
sides being creative writers, are highly selective in their choice of 
relevant data. But many modern professors tend to toss their excess 
research into the annotation hopper and leave it to their readers (or 
editors) to separate the salient stuff from the mildly tangential. That's 
why it's harder to write without footnotes than with them: it takes a 
good writer to decide what's on point and what's off - it's easier to 
keep baby and bathwater in the same textual tub. And it's safer, 
both intellectually (allowing the writer to straddle any issue by taking 
a strong position in the text while waffling below) and morally (per-
mitting him to stave off plagiarism with grudging acknowledgments 
in four-point type) - not to mention more ego-gratifying (enabling 
intricate citation of arcane sources at stupefying length). 
The number of notes in an article is still deemed a measure of its 
erudition. Although there are occasions of reverse snobbery - where 
it is implied (as in this essay)58 that notes are beneath an author's 
time, dignity or expertise - the more common scholarship seeks to 
impress by both magnitude and multitude of bottom-matter. The 
longer the note, the greater the breadth of its author's knowledge; the 
more numerous the references, the more comprehensive his treatment 
of the subject matter. The current individual record-holder is Arnold 
58 See supra note *; infra note 67. For a good example of authors' disdain for footnotes 
flying in the face of editorial compulsion to add them, see Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over 
Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984). 
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S. Jacobs, Esq., who recently drew his readers away from the text 
no fewer than 4824 times - easily eclipsing the former mark held by 
Dean Jesse Choper (16II) as well as the group title (3917 by the 
Georgetown Law Journal staff).59 Too bad no promotion-and-tenure 
credit is given the transcendent task of bushwhacking through such 
unintelligible thickets. 
Some writers limit their notes strictly to citations of authority, 
disdaining what they consider flights of creative irrelevance and eso-
teric nit-picking. But the purists are passe. The new chic in noting 
is to write rambling distinctions laced with "fugitive" sources - exotic 
references, rare books, or "letters on file with the author." Incompre-
hensible law-and-economics graphs and diagrams are also In. 6o 
59 See Oser, Numerous Notes No Shot in Foot, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 16, 1989, at 35, col. I; sec 
also Jacobs, An Analysis of Section I6 of the Securities Exchange Act of I934, 32 N. Y.L. SCH. 
L. REv. 209 (1987) (accompanying Jacobs' 4824 footnotes with 491 pages of text); Choper, 
Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. 
L. REv. I (1984) (accompanying Choper's 16II footnotes with 208 pages of text); Project, 
Sixteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and COl/rts of 
Appeals I98S-I986, 75 GEO. L.J. 713 (1987) (accompanying the Georgetown staff's 3917 foot-
notes with 585 pages of text). The alleged record-holder for judicial opinions is United States 
v. E.!. Dupont de Nemours & Co., II8 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), with 1715 footnotes. Sec 
Kaplan, The Article in a Law Review That Included the Most Footnotes Is ... , Nat'l L.J., 
Mar. 18, 1985, at 4, col. 3. Equally useful information: Disney animators drew 6,469,952 black 
spots for the film IOI Dalmatians; there were 17,500,000,000 charcoal briquettes sold in 1988; 
and 24% of all Iowans display lawn ornaments. See Harper's Index, HARPER'!:, May, 1989, at 
15· 
60 I am indebted to my colleague Robert Lande for the following graphic elucidation of my 
several theses: 
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A remarkably similar law-and-economics graph was recently sighted in Gillcte & Hopkins, 
Federal User Fees: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 67 B.U.L. REV. 795, 810 (1987). Such 
charts are as incomprehensible to lawyers as higher mathematics or advanced psychology are to 
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Two primary strains of footnote virus were identified early on in 
the law review epidemic: (I) the explanatory (or if-you-didn't-under-
stand-what-I-wrote-in-the-text-here's-another-stab-at-it) type, and (2) 
the vainglorious (or if-you're-from-Kalamazoo-just-take-a-gander-at-
this) variety. 61 
Most scholars, however, refuse to recognize footnoting as a disease 
at all, arguing the benefits that inure to both writer and reader of 
teensy typography. Indeed, they spare the reader a barrage of tech-
nical trivia he may not need, enable him to uncover shortcomings in 
authority, and allow for a smoother-running text. At the same time, 
they let a writer more easily separate basic concepts from nuances, 
and sometimes force him to justify his positions. 62 
On occasion, notes become more important than text. Witness the 
famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,63 in 
which Justice Stone announced the landmark principle of constitu-
tional jurisprudence that statutes affecting "discrete and insular mi-
norities" must be given strict scrutiny. There's also note fifty-nine in 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.64 and note sixteen in Terry 
v. Ohio65 (which has been cited well over a hundred times). 
The most lucid analysis of the subject is a recent article by Arthur 
Austin,66 whose tongue-in-cheek tone is somewhat overwhelmed both 
by serious assertions in defense of footnotes and by I07 of his own. 67 
"In today's publish or perish environment," he writes, "footnote trash-
ing is the slothful tenured establishment's last refuge of snobbery. "68 
Au contraire, he suggests that footnoting permits one author to dif-
ferentiate his work from another's - an "artistic and abstruse disci-
pline that functions as a subtle, but critical, influence in the deter-
mination of promotion, tenure, and professional status. "69 Moreover, 
laypersons. See, e.g., Grossman, Stability in n-Dimensional Differential,-Delay Equations, 40 
J. MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS ApPLICATIONS 541 (1972); G. ZURIFF, BEHAVIORISM: A CONCEP-
TUAL RECONSTRUCTION (1985). Grossman and Zuriff are close friends of the author. See infra 
note 62. 
61 With all due respect to Rodell, cited above in note 2, at 40, I think my version is better. 
62 See Martin, supra note 47, at 1097. They also allow a writer to cite self, family, friends, 
and colleagues. See, e.g., supra notes 28 & 60; infra notes 72, 109 & II3. 
63 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 275 
(1988) (noting the importance of Carotene Products' footnote four from a deconstructionist's 
point of view). 
64 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). 
6S 392 U.S. I, 19 n.16 (1968). 
66 Austin, supra note 35. 
67 My congratulations to the reader discerning enough to question how I have the gall to 
chide Austin for his apparent hypocrisy, when I offer over a hundred notes of my own. My 
somewhat lame excuse ("the editors made me do it!" - see supra note *) is hereby accompanied 
by both abject apologies and an offer to supply another version of this selfsame piece -
unannotated - to anyone who asks. 
68 Austin, supra note 35, at II53. 
69 [d. at II35. 
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footnotes "serve as embryos for new ideas and an underground source 
for humor"70 (no doubt he refers to classics such as The Common Law 
Origins oj the Infield Fly Rule71 and my own Mockingbirds Among 
the Brethren72 ). Not least, he points out that footnoting helps create 
the aura of elevated status that ultimately furnishes academics with 
hefty consulting fees. 73 
But as with the reviews themselves, the negatives far outweigh 
the positives. Even Austin recognizes the criticism that footnotes have 
become "a serious embarrassment to legal scholarship. "74 Others have 
called them '''phony excrescences,"'75 "a means of concealment,"76 
"hedges against forthright statements in the text,'>77 and little more 
than a "foible [that] breeds nothing but sloppy thinking, clumsy writ-
ing, and bad eyes."78 Former Justice Arthur Goldberg felt that foot-
notes "cause more problems than they solve."79 Judge Abner Mikva 
thought they represent dubious erudition - an "abomination" that he 
hates to read: "If footnotes were a rational form of communication, 
Darwinian selection would have resulted in the eyes being set verti-
cally rather than on an inefficient horizontal plane. "80 Or, as Noel 
Coward put it, encountering a footnote "'is like going downstairs to 
answer the doorbell while making love. "'81 
It's hard enough to keep track of a modern scholar's train of 
thought without having to jump back and forth from text to note. 
But it's virtually impossible to comprehend footnotes that make ample 
use of the signals recommended by A Uniform System oj Citation (the 
"Bluebook"). Show me someone who can explain the difference be-
tween but see and but cf. and I'll show you a world-class master of 
utterly useless distinctions. 82 
The core of the problem is the lack of moderation. The notes 
often take on a life of their own, snuffing out whatever line of logic 
70 [d. at II53. 
71 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1474 (1975). 
72 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 441 (1981). 
73 See Austin, supra note 35, at II55. 
74 [d. at II33. 
75 Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 647, 647 (1985) (quoting Professor 
Rodell). 
76 D. MELLINKOFF, LEGAL WRITING: SENSE AND NONSENSE 94 (1982). 
77 [d. 
78 Rodell, supra note 2, at 41. 
79 Goldberg, The Rise and Fall (We Hope) of Footnotes, 69 A.B.A. J. 255, 255 (1983). 
Justice Goldberg may have resigned in part because of footnotes. Complaining about an 
appellate opinion with over 500 notes, he observed: "Had I remained on the Supreme Court, I 
would have reversed him on this ground because of the sheer impossibility of reviewing an 
opinion of this type." !d. 
80 Mikva, supra note 75, at 647-48. 
81 Barrett, supra note 57, at I n.2, col. 3 (quoting Coward). 
82 See A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, rule 2.2(C) (14th ed. 1986). 
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the writer seeks to impart. If originality is the goal, why such exces-
sive attribution? Compare the typically bloated American law review 
article with its British counterpart: the latter is generally leaner and 
cleaner, with far fewer footnotes - and hence eminently more read-
able. 
Scholarship is no different from any other writing in its basic 
function: communication. But the geometric growth of footnote 
density83 is fundamentally at odds with that purpose. Recognition of 
such counter-productivity has been slow in coming, but bubbles up 
here and there in new journals that publish shorter, more provocative 
articles, and in a few established law reviews - hoping to counter 
similar criticism of their own deadweight pieces - which include 
relatively note-free "Essay and Dialogue" sections. 84 
B. Analysis: Separating the Taut from the Tautological 
To Mr. Webster, "analysis" is simply (r) "separation of a whole 
into its component parts" and/or (2) "an examination of a complex, its 
elements, and their relations. "85 
For purposes of promotion and tenure, however, the term appears 
to defy definition - even though every P & T Committee requires 
that, for scholarship to pass muster, it must be "analytical." Consider 
again the attempt made py the typical faculty manual noted earlier: 
to be analytical "[t]he materials must provide a detailed, well-sup-
ported and sophisticated analysis that increases our understanding of 
the topic, and must do more than describe a body of law or a legal 
problem. "86 Talk about tautology: to be analytical, the materials must 
provide an analysis! In virtually every case, determination of whether 
an article increases our understanding of the topic or does anything 
more than describe a body of law or a legal problem depends almost 
entirely on subjective factors. The more familiar the reader with the 
subject matter, the less analytical the article; the more the reader 
favors a candidate, the better the analysis; and if the reader dislikes 
the candidate for any of many reasons, he can discreetly dismiss the 
analysis as wanting. This can be done in all manner of obfuscatory 
language. For example, a tenured associate generally regarded as an 
effective teacher was recently denied a promotion, largely based on a 
committee report stating that his work "did not disprove an accepted 
understanding of what the law is or how it works"; it did not provide 
"a fresh conceptual framework"; it did not "break new ground." 
83 See Austin, supra note 35, at II44-45. 
84 See, e.g., Essays and Correspondence sections of volumes 84 to 88 (present) of the 
Michigall Law Review. 
8S WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 48, at 82. 
86 BALTIMORE FACULTY HANDBOOK, supra note 50, at H-I.6. 
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We'd be more intellectually honest (and fair) if we were to apply 
a more liberal meaning to the word "analytical." A workable defini-
tion, it seems to me, is "that which describes a body of knowledge, 
and offers an opinion about it." The true measure of an article's 
quality should be how well it describes the subject, how tautly it is 
written, and how cogent we think the opinion - even if we disagree. 
A more honest approach (with ourselves and our colleagues) would 
begin by conceding the semantic truism that practically everything is 
analytical to a degree - and by making our sincere and subjective 
judgment based on how well we like it (or its author). 
Changing our definition of analysis to give it practical meaning 
would also help us escape the law review mindset, and thereby allow 
us to reward the writer of useful, enlightening, and provocative essays 
- as well as restatements, treatises, practice manuals, model legis-
lation, and all manner of interdisciplinary texts. 
C. Writing: Bugaboo oj the Poobahs 
It may be hard to say whether good writers are born or made, 
but it's painfully obvious that few of them are legal scholars. Law 
review prose is predominantly bleak and turgid. Moreover, it seems 
to be self-perpetuating. The brightest students, should they become 
teachers, are still browbeaten into writing what has been called a 
"wonderful profusion of humbug."87 Many observers have noted the 
apprehension with which the law school elite regard a student or 
professor who resists legalese and insists on simple prose in writing 
and speech; the scholarship of such rare beasts is often regarded as 
suspect. 88 
Similarly, length remains a hallmark of erudition. "[L]et your 
words be few, "89 said Solomon himself, but the legal scholars continue 
to exalt quantity. Thus if a good writing professor suggests to the 
poobahs on the curriculum committee that they reduce the number of 
required pages in students' first-year memoranda or their third-year 
independent research papers, he will likely be voted down. Few 
faculty members understand that the shorter a memo, the more clear 
and effective it usually is. Nor would they fathom why Mark Twain 
once apologized for a lengthy letter by saying that he didn't have 
enough time to write a brief one; it's often more difficult to be concise. 
These are the same folks who make promotion-and-tenure decisions 
87 Shenefelt, Disposable Scholarship, Washington Post, Sept. 12, 1989, at A2I, col. I-
88 See, e.g., Rodell, supra note 5, at 289; see also Wright, supra note 2, at 1460 (observing 
Rodell's belief that he was denied an endowed chair because he wrote for non-academic publi-
cations). 
89 Ecclesiastes 5:1. 
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based on the length of law review articles. 9o Next we'll be measuring 
page size as we tally up the footnotes. 
The way law review articles are written may be the primary reason 
that they are so widely unread. The legal scholar's standard prose 
has been criticized as everything from "patronizing"91 and "pompous 
patois"92 to unintelligible "gibberish. "93 Its long sentences, awkward 
syntax, and overweening commitment to noncommittal buzzwords are 
at once impressive-sounding and useless. 
The law reviews' pretentiousness and singular lack of humor have 
been noted earlier. Rodell himself suggested a means by which that 
weakness could be overcome: "The best way to get a laugh out of a 
law review is to take a couple of drinks and then read an article, any 
article, aloud. That can be real1y funny. "94 
Humor aside, the reasons behind such poor writing may have as 
much to do with the perceived purpose of legal scholarship - indeed 
the scholar's understanding of the purpose of law itself - as with an 
inability to follow basic rules of grammar, syntax, and style. 
Let us suppose that the purpose of law is the betterment of society. 
Although it is hard to see how the esoterica so often offered up by 
law reviews has any measurable application to real-life problem-solv-
ing,95 let us assume these writers do have something serious to say 
that may be of value to society's decisionmakers, whether it is about 
law and literature, critical legal studies, feminist law - or dog bites 
in South Carolina.96 Is there any justification for not saying it with 
greater clarity? 
All too frequently the language of scholars is "far removed from 
the emotions, language, and understandings of the great majority of 
human beings, "97 and the law they seek to analyze, criticize, explain, 
or change is lost in a sea of verbal molasses. Those who want to 
influence social policy in a more liberal direction have even greater 
reason to write understandable English. The intellectual movers and 
90 One faculty I know passed a by-law that a law review article of twenty pages or longer 
would presumptively satisfy its promotion-and-tenure standards - anything shorter and the 
burden of proof would shift to the candidate. The authenticity of this story has been verified 
by conversations with a number of colleagues. 
91 See Getman, supra note 38, at 581. 
92 See Rodell, supra note 5, at 289. 
93 See Benson, The End of Legalese: The Game Is Over, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 
519, 520-22 (1984-1985); Shenefelt, supra note 87. 
94 Rodell, supra note 2, at 40. Even law professors' intentional efforts at humor are likely 
to engender more groans than belly-laughs. See, e.g., On the Lighter Side, 39 J. LEGAL Enuc. 
47-54 (1989); On the Lighter Side, 38 J. LEGAL Enuc. 359-68 (1988); see also Leibman & 
White, supra note 39, at 423 ("[M]ost attempts by legal writers to employ irony and hyperbole 
range from ill-advised to pathetic."). But see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
95 See Elson, supra note 34, at 347-99. 
96 See supra note 16. 
97 Getman, supra note 38, at 580. 
944 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
shakers need the support of workers, activists, and politicians alike; 
new social orders are impossible when such diverse groups cannot 
comprehend one another's language - or feel alienated by it. Pro-
grams championed in the Ivory Tower but unheard or unfathomed in 
town or in board- or caucus-rooms are unlikely to see life beyond the 
scarcely-read pages upon which they are printed - a brief flicker 
between the time they come off the presses and when they begin to 
yellow, tightly bound in dusty library stacks. 98 
But let us suppose further that there is value in scholars discours-
ing among themselves, that it is easier and more efficacious for them 
to use the specialized terminology familiar to those in the discipline. 
A central problem here is that such highly technical or narrowly 
targeted articles frequently appear in the general-interest law reviews. 
The tension between necessary jargon and editorial clarity, between 
influencing a small audience and accommodating a broader one, is 
overwhelming if not impossible. The lay lawyer reading a scholarly 
legal essay is hard put to understand it, much less see its search for 
Truth. His eyes glazeth over - not only at its length, but its style 
and substance as well. 
One might argue that medical journals are every bit as impene-
trable to the average doctor as law reviews to the lawyer, yet no one 
criticizes them for being too technical. But the analogy is weak: the 
"truths" sought are essentially different (a medical researcher examines 
the safety or effectiveness of a particular drug or procedure or therapy 
or policy, and bases his conclusions on specific empirical data), and 
most medical reviews are explicitly aimed at specialists in the field 
who understand the terms of art (there are relatively few general-
interest scientific journals). Law professors, on the other hand, often 
engage in philosophical discourse that has little practical application, 
and their colloquies are seldom confined to special-interest reviews. 
Communicating clearly, however - even about complex legal 
ideas - should not be an impossible task. 
Charles Alan Wright recalls a legal writing seminar he took while 
a law student at Yale, in which his professor - none other than Fred 
Rodell - asked a guest scholar to pick one of his own articles, open 
it at random, and read a paragraph. The scholar obliged, says 
Wright, and read a paragraph "filled with the jargon and convolutions 
that mark most legal writing. "99 When he finished, Rodell asked him 
what the paragraph meant. "[He] sputtered for a moment and then 
gave a brief and clear explanation of the proposition he had stated at 
much greater length in the article. 'Why didn't you write it that 
way?', [Rodell] asked. The point was made."lOO To which Professor 
98 See id. at 588. 
99 Wright, supra note 2, at 1458. 
100 [d. 
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Wright adds: "I am sure that thirty years of very orthodox academic 
writing have corrupted my style, but I like to think that even today 
my books and articles and briefs are better because of what Fred 
taught me in that seminar. "101 
Students who may be naturally predisposed to avoiding difficult 
legal concepts will surely shy away from coming to grips with the 
nebulous ideas presented in a great many law review articles. The 
scholarly voice invites analysis by generalities and lacks the discipline 
demanded by empirical research. It requires students to learn a new, 
complex language that will probably be irrelevant to their future 
careers. 102 
Lest you think this a diatribe without foundation, consider the 
following examples selected more or less at random from recent re-
views. On law and literature: 
It is one thing . . . to blur the divide between the creation and 
criticism of literature, and quite another to blur the distinction be-
tween the creation and criticism of law. Historically, the consequence 
of the blending of the law and the moral basis from which we criticize 
law has almost always been a politically regressive insistence upon the 
morality of existing power; and the present decade's fashionable denial 
of the difference between fact and value (whether indulged by the 
political left or by the political center) has proven to be no exception. 
The most obvious and compelling implication of the claim that there 
is no real difference between the law that is and the law that ought 
to be is that the law which is, is perfect: the law that is, is as it ought 
to be. The anti-positivist blurring of that which is from that which 
ought to be entails a non-critical, accepting complacency with the 
status quo. 103 
Granted, this passage is taken out of context - but take it for 
granted that the context is every bit as abstruse. If you would rather 
flagellate yourself by attempting to understand such "scholarship," try 
answering these questions: how can the "creation" and "criticism" of 
either law or literature be regarded as parallels capable of distinction? 
How can the difference be blurred between the creation of a book (or 
film or work of art) and its criticism? How can the law and "the 
moral basis from which we criticize law" be blended? What is the 
difference between "fact" and "value"? Between "the law that is" and 
"the law that ought to be"? What is the writer trying to tell us? That 
his sense of syntax is out to lunch? Most readers of general-interest 
101Id. 
102 See Getman, supra note 38, at 58!. 
103 Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the Law-As-Literature 
Movement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203, 208-09 (1987). The names of the perpetrators of this and 
the next several passages have been withheld, in the hopes of preventing hard feelings and libel 
suits. 
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journals, unfamiliar with the specific scholarly voice, would not easily 
be able to discern a clear meaning. 
Such illustrations appear all through law reviews aimed at broad 
readerships. On Critical Legal Studies (this from Harvard): 
The two internal critical themes stand by synecdoche for the two 
major traditions of criticism of modern society that antedate the rise 
of modernist literature and philosophy. One of these traditions objects 
to the denial of solidarity and to the absence of the varieties of 
communal life that could mediate between the isolated individual and 
the large-scale organizations of the social world. The other tradition 
emphasizes the continuity of group domination under forms of practice 
and thought that both conceal and reproduce it. The deviationist 
doctrinal argument shows how the two traditions can merge into a 
more comprehensive and satisfactory line of criticism once analysis 
descends to institutional detail. The practical and theoretical solutions 
to the problem of overcorrecting and undercorrecting contract con-
verge with the implications of the attempt to soften the antagonism 
between contract and community. 104 
How many readers will be able to define or divine what "synec-
doche" means? How many intellectual gear-shifts can they be ex-
pected to make in order to plow through the hazy double-negatives 
in "objects to the denial . . . and to the absence of . . . that could 
mediate between"? In the third sentence, does the closing "it" refer to 
"tradition"? To "continuity"? To "domination"? Where has the "anal-
ysis" in the next sentence been, before it "descends to institutional 
detail"? What is the intended connotation of "contract" in the last 
sentence? Responsible scholarship (or editing) would supply clarifi-
cations where needed, either in text or footnote. !OS All too often, 
though, the words stare back. 
Meaning aside, elementary matters of grammar, style and syntax 
- what Swift referred to as "proper words in proper places"106 -
104 The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561, 645 (1983). Despite 
entreaties from various law review editors, I found it hard to shorten this excerpt. Its length 
not only underscores its longwindedness, but accurately suggests that this passage is one of 
many in the article equally difficult to decipher. 
105 For an example of good use of explanatory notes, see Fisher & Lande, Efjiciellcy Con-
siderations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1580, 1600-02 nn.87-loo (1983). 
106 Letter to a Young Clergyman (Jan. 9, 1720), reprinted in J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR 
QUOTATIONS 322 (15th ed. 1980). Examples of weak syntax are easy to find, and likewise not 
limited to radical legal scholarship. Here are several from articles I've cited elsewhere in this 
Commentary: "Their environmental sensitivity, immense migrations, and economic value, com-
bined with a long history of bitter allocation struggles, make anadromous fish a fruitful area 
for legal study." Why Study Pacific Salmon Law?, supra note 23, at 630. "Finally, it must be 
noted that there may well be situations where an animal attacks without provocation and has 
failed to behave in a manner reasonably calculated to provide the owner with prior notice or 
warning regarding its tendency or inclination to attack." If Spot Bites the Neighbor, Shollid 
Dick and Jane Go to Jail?, supra note 16, at 1474. 
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are often beyond the ken of authors and editors. If good writing is a 
reflection of clear thinking, the poobahs of scholarship are either a 
bunch of bumbleheads or a barrelful of bad writers. The weight of 
the evidence points to the latter. 
Finally, these words-to-live-by from a feminist law professor: 
The first purpose of this essay is to put forward the global and critical 
claim that by virtue of their shared embrace of the separation thesis, 
all of our modern legal theory - by which I mean "liberal legalism" 
and "critical legal theory" collectively - is essentially and irretrievably 
masculine. My use of "I" above was inauthentic, just as the modern, 
increasing use of the female pronoun in liberal and critical legal theory, 
although well-intended, is empirically and experientially false. For 
the cluster of claims that jointly constitute the "separation thesis" -
the claim that human beings are, definition ally, distinct from one 
another, the claim that the referent of "I" is singular and unambiguous, 
the claim that the word "individual" has an uncontested biological 
meaning, namely that we are each physically individuated from every 
other, the claim that we are individuals "first," and the claim that 
what separates us is epistemologically and morally prior to what con-
nects us - while "trivially true" of men, are patently untrue of 
women. Women are not essentially, necessarily, inevitably, invariably, 
always, and forever separate from other human beings: women, dis-
tinctively, are quite clearly "connected" to another human life when 
pregnant. In fact, women are in some sense "connected" to life and 
to other human beings during at least four recurrent and critical 
material experiences: the experience of pregnancy itself; the invasive 
and "connecting" experience of heterosexual penetration, which may 
lead to pregnancy; the monthly experience of menstruation, which 
represents the potential for pregnancy; and the post-pregnancy expe-
rience of breast-feeding. Indeed, perhaps the central insight of femi-
nist theory of the last decade has been that women are "essentially 
connected," not "essentially separate," from the rest of human life, 
both materially, through pregnancy, intercourse, and breast-feeding 
and existentially, through the moral and practical life. If by "human 
beings" legal theorists mean women as well as men, then the "sepa-
ration thesis" is clearly false. If, alternatively, by "human beings" they 
mean those for whom the separation thesis is true, then women are 
not human beings. It's not hard to guess which is meant. 107 
Let's try to take this passage weakness by weakness. In the first 
sentence the plural possessive "their" does not agree with the singular 
noun it modifies, "theory." Or should "claim" be plural? By "inau-
thentic," does the writer mean "not genuine"? The standard student 
If" Jllyispmdwce alld Gelldey, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1988). For an attempt to decipher 
the legal feminists' agenda, see Bowles, 'Feminist Scholarship' alld 'Women's Studies': Impli-
ca/iollS jor Ulliversity Presses, 19 SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING 163 (1988); and Lewin, Feminist 
Scholars Spurrillg a Rethinking oj Law, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1988, at B9, col. 3. 
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Webster's informs that "experiential" means "empirical"; why use both? 
The singular collective noun "cluster" at the beginning of the third 
sentence disagrees with the plural verb "are" near the end - a nitpick, 
perhaps, in view of the seventy-eight words piled on in between. 
What is meant by "epistemologically" as it is juxtaposed here with 
"morally"? Or by "'trivially true'" as it is placed within quotation 
marks? Is there any meaningful difference among the words "essen-
tially," "necessarily," "inevitably," "invariably," "always," and "for-
ever"? Why use them all, except to betray the writer's anger? (And 
if that's the case, why not add "fundamentally," "basically," and "el-
ementary"?) Slogging through the rest of the paragraph, we are stag-
gered by the syllogism at the end; it's doubtful that open-minded 
readers (particularly nonfeminists) will have an easy time guessing 
which conclusion is intended. What's it all mean? Those who have 
been especially dogged in trudging through this polysyllabic sludge 
may be left with little more than the flimsy notion that it is, after all, 
a man's world. 
Is this brilliant insight, or intellectual quicksand? You decide. lo8 
My Commentary is of course less on the substance of these para-
graphs than on their form. Whatever messages they seek to deliver 
are lost in a jumble of jargon and gibberish. The point is this: if our 
purpose as scholars is to explain and persuade, we are most likely to 
succeed if we write simply and clearly. 109 
IV. NARCISSISM AND OTHER PERCEPTIONS 
Why such passionate preoccupation with the irrelevant, such obei-
sance to the obscure? A final word about motivation is in order. 
"Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, . . . all is vanity!"110 
Besides the life-force craving of promotion and tenure, for many 
a law professor image is easily as important as substance. To treat 
the arcane in traditional academic prose is to impress one's colleagues. 
To be published, even cited, in an Ivy League law review is considered 
J08 In the interest of fairness I conducted a mini-survey regarding this last excerpt. Of ten 
readers asked if they understood it, two said yes-I-think-I-do-but-it's-not-very-c1ear: a professor 
familiar with feminist literature, and the editor-in-chief of a leading law review. Eight said no-
I-can't-figurc-it-out: a practitioner who graduated magna cum laude from Harvard, a feminist 
librarian, a law review faculty advisor, a law-and-economics professor, a housewife with a 
master's degree in education, the author of nine published books, a law school dean, and a 
recent Rhodes Scholar. 
109 See Wright, supra note 2, at 1457-58. Even some law professors who fancy themselves 
good writers have lapses now and then. See, e.g., Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free SPeech: 
When Big Brother Should Butt In, 23 DUQ. L. REv. n, II2 (1984). But see Lessard, What 
Do People Do All Day (Book Review), Washington Monthly, Mar. 1972, at 41, 47 (comparing 
"Lasson's clean simple prose" with "[Ralph] Nader's cliche-ridden and windy" writing). 
110 Ecclesiastes 1:2. 
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to be a feather in one's professional cap. To be spurned by the East 
Parsipanny Journal of Nursery School Law, on the other hand, is 
ignominy most bitter (and usually suffered alone, without telling even 
one's spouse). 
Habitual publication in law reviews is especially useful to those 
professors who view themselves as Traveling Scholars, available on 
short notice to grace the halls of fellow law schools for a semester or 
two with their particular brand of out-of-town expertise. But even 
here the shinola quickly rubs off. And to be roundly ignored while 
visiting may be the worst blow of all to self-esteem, a measure of 
inferiority that is often visited in turn upon one's colleagues at home. 
Scholarship thus becomes inalterably bound up in politics. It was 
a wise professor who said the reason academic politics are so sordid 
is that the stakes are so low. 
V. OLIVE BRANCHES AND ApOLOGIA 
(CONCLUSION AND SELF-PRAISE) 
Biting the hand that feeds can be very satisfying when protected 
by tenure and academic freedom. But the point of this piece is to 
urge that we move away from rewarding "scholarship" alone - let's 
let the writers be writers, the scholars scholars, teachers teachers, and 
leaders leaders - and give them credit accordingly.ll1 Let's recognize 
good writing as valuable, even if it's not in a law review, and promote 
service to the community at least every bit as much as journal schol-
arship of questionable worth. Let's mold faculty as position players, 
not as clones of one another. Let's require all to be at least minimally 
competent in the classroom and the library, but not require proof of 
professionalism by way of intellectual coercion or passage through the 
publication chute. Surely there are better ways to measure quality. 
An olive branch to the Good Reader and Scholar alike: we should 
all be forgiven for giving in to the system, for nurturing it ollt of a 
strong sense of self-preservation - seeking if nothing else to put bread 
on our tables in the way we know best. We mean no harm, even if 
we offer little of lasting value. 
r utter this Apologia with full recognition of my own knowing 
participation in the process, completely aware that whatever few read-
ers are out there may indeed view Lasson's Scholarly Production as 
III Again, the fact that this is hardly a new plea should underscore both its importance and 
the likelihood that it will go unheeded. As Bard states: 
Scholarship is neither served nor celebrated by using it as the fine mesh to sift out some 
of our colleagues. Scholarship cannot be coerced, only cultivated. No one can stop a 
real scholar. And no useful end is served by squeezing some pages out of unwilling 
wri,ters, who are enthusiastic teachers .... 
Bard, supra note 43, at 245; see Rodell, supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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utterly useless - itself little more than the pretentious pap he so 
roundly excoriates.1I2 True, I like to think I have had something 
original to say (and have guiltlessly accepted remuneration via re-
search grant or summer stipend). Yet all of my "scholarship" - as 
that of most others - must be viewed as exceedingly modest when 
compared to that ofa true scholar.113 
Moreover, I am cognizant of the possibility that - though Solomon 
may have had a point - I myself may be unable to avoid cooking 
up yet another black pot of scholarly porridge, and thereby run the 
risk of various other professorial kettles recalling my past aspersions 
cast asunder. 114 
112 Those interested in bashing my own scholarship are enthusiastically invited to do so. 
See, e.g., Lasson, supra note 109. My most recent pieces are Free Exercise ill the Free State: 
Marylalld's Role ill Religious Liberty alld the First Ame1ldmellt, 31 J. CHURCH & ST. 419 
(1989); and Racism ill Great Britaill: Drawillg the Lille 011 Free Speech, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD 
L.J. 161 (1987). 
113 (Like, say, my father - whose single small book on the fourth amendment has been 
cited frequently by the Supreme Court.) See N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937). See, e.g., United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 934 n.4 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984); 
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 375 (1983). LEXIS refers to a host of others. 
114 Note, however, that I regard myself as in a no-lose situation. Should I attract n lot of 
flack for failure of understanding or gratitude, at least I wiII have finally provoked a thoughtful, 
if outraged, response to my work. And my articles wiII have been cited in the Harvard Law 
Review, even if it is I who has done the citing. On the other hand, if I get no response, well, 
that proves my point, doesn't it? 
